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Abstract	
	
In	1912,	Eikichi	Iso	arrived	to	serve	as	a	plant	breeder	in	the	Japanese	colony	of	Taiwan.	
Iso	and	his	researchers	developed	crossbred	Horai	rice	that	produced	the	round	grains	
desired	by	Japanese	consumers.	This	article	explains	how	Horai	rice	made	Taiwan	 into	
an	economically	viable	possession	of	the	Japanese	Empire.	Iso	matched	the	terrain	and	
conditions	of	Taiwan	to	the	regions	of	the	Japanese	home	islands	closest	 in	character,	
and	the	varieties	 from	each	region	were	selected	 for	experimentation	at	 field	stations	
located	in	the	matching	Taiwanese	region.	The	experiments	yielded	new	varieties	of	rice	
that	 fostered	 trade	 relations	 between	 Taiwan	 and	 the	 home	 islands.	 This	 change	
brought	about	higher	incomes	but	also	increased	costs	for	the	farmers.	The	addition	of	a	
new	 cash	 crop	unsettled	 Japanese	 attempts	 to	manage	 the	 sugar	 industry,	 instigating	
greater	state	 intervention	 in	rice	markets,	even	as	war	demand	meant	that	Taiwanese	
rice	 became	 indispensable.	 The	 success	 of	 Horai	 gave	 Taiwan	 an	 identity	 as	 a	 rice	
colony,	which	 its	 leaders	sought	 to	 leverage	as	expertise	 to	colonize	newly	conquered	
Hainan.	The	movement	of	people,	ideas,	and	the	genetic	materials	of	rice	plants	created	
a	“Japanized”	Taiwan	that	in	turn	expanded	beyond	the	shores	of	the	island	colony.	
	
Keywords:	 Taiwan,	 Japanese	 Empire,	 history	 of	 agriculture,	 history	 of	 science,	 rice,	
Horai,	genetics	
	
	
The	average	yield	of	rice	given	for	Taiwan	is	13	koku	per	hectare.	…At	
the	time	of	annexation	the	average	yield	was	only	6	koku	per	hectare.	
(Mendiola	1949,	69)	
	
Nemesio	 B.	 Mendiola,	 a	 plant	 breeder	 with	 the	 Department	 of	 Agriculture	 of	 the	
Philippines,	visited	Taiwan	in	1944	to	observe	the	noteworthy	accomplishments	in	rice	
cultivation	 science	 and	 technology	 on	 Japan’s	 island	 colony.	 This	 article	 presents	 the	
way	 colonial	 ideology	 in	 Taiwan	 was	 shaped	 by	 the	 perceived	 power	 of	 scientific	
research	witnessed	by	Mendiola	and	other	observers	 from	further	afield.	The	 focus	of	
this	 article	 is	 the	work	 of	 Eikichi	 Iso,	 a	 Japanese	 plant	 breeder	 active	 in	 Taiwan	 from	
1912	until	the	1950s,	after	the	Republic	of	China	took	control	of	Taiwan.	He	succeeded	
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in	 crossbreeding	 Japanese	 varieties	 with	 others	 to	 produce	 new	 types	 that	 could	 be	
grown	on	Taiwanese	soil	to	produce	rice	grains	preferred	by	Japanese	consumers.	These	
varieties,	 known	 collectively	 as	 Horai,	 transformed	 both	 the	 internal	 economy	 and	
external	trade	of	Taiwan.	The	success	of	Horai	as	a	cash	crop	interfered	with	the	policies	
laid	out	by	the	Government-General	of	Taiwan	to	protect	Japanese	sugar	interests.	Yet,	
as	Horai	rice	became	an	integral	part	of	the	fabric	of	the	Taiwanese	political	economy,	
Taiwan’s	 Japanese	 rulers	 progressively	 adopted	 it	 as	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 their	 decision	
making	and	their	vision	for	the	future	of	the	colony.	
Taiwan	was	a	place	remade	by	colonialism	 long	before	 its	annexation	by	Japan	 in	
1895	 and	 the	 subsequent	 Japanese	 rule.	 In	 the	 mid-seventeenth	 century,	 Dutch	
colonists	 brought	 sugar	 as	 a	 crop	 along	 with	 Chinese	 farmers	 for	 their	 skills	 and	
numbers,	and	exported	rice	to	faraway	Persia	and	the	Netherlands	(Koo	2015).	After	the	
Qing	 Empire	 took	 Taiwan	 in	 the	 1680s,	 output	 growth	was	 achieved	 not	 through	 the	
application	of	new	technology	but	with	the	opening	of	new	land	for	agriculture	and	the	
addition	of	labor	inputs	(Isett	1995).	As	a	result,	Taiwan	experienced	close	to	zero	per-
capita	 growth	 at	 0.3	 percent	 annually	 in	 the	 late	Qing	 period	 (1880s–1890s),	 but	 this	
rate	increased	to	more	than	2	percent	under	Japanese	rule	(Wu	2001,	3).	Taiwan	came	
to	be	“islanded”—a	concept	proposed	by	historian	Sujit	Sivasundaram	(2013)—via	 the	
action	 of	 successive	 colonizing	 powers,	 as	 new	 links	 were	 forged	 while	 old	 relations	
were	disconnected.	Such	was	the	palimpsest	of	plants,	people,	and	technologies	fused	
by	various	forms	of	alien	governance	that	provided	the	base	for	Japanese-ruled	Taiwan	
and	its	agriculture.	
	
Imperatives	for	the	Development	of	Colonial	Science	
	
Europeans’	journeys	of	exploration	and	conquest	to	Africa	and	Asia	beginning	in	the	late	
1400s	 brought	 them	 into	 contact	 with	 unfamiliar	 flora	 and	 fauna.	 Their	 exploitative	
mode	 of	 production	 frequently	 led	 to	 despoliation	 of	 the	 environment.	 Measures	 to	
curb	 the	early	 reckless	 deforestation	engendered	by	negligent	 colonists	 brought	 forth	
botanical	gardens,	such	as	those	of	Cape	Town	and	Mauritius,	which	were	replicated	in	
other	tropical	colonies.	Meanwhile,	Europeans	were	exposed	to	strange	diseases	whose	
cures	were	often	found	in	local	plants.	Interaction	with	the	native	peoples	of	these	lands	
resulted	 in	 the	 absorption	 of	 the	 knowledge	 of	 indigenous	 pharmacopoeia	 into	 the	
European	 corpus	 through	 translations	 and	 compilations	 (Grove	 1995).	 From	 the	
disasters	of	early	colonization	arose	the	habitus	of	conservation	and	an	appreciation	of	
tropical	plant	knowledge.	
By	 the	 mid-nineteenth	 century,	 colonial	 botanical	 gardens	 were	 producing	
economically	 valuable	 knowledge	 in	 a	 form	 that	 made	 them	 the	 equivalent	 of	 the	
industrial	 research	 laboratories	 of	 today	 (Brockway	 1979).	 Cinchona	 for	 quinine	 and	
Hevea	 brasiliensis	 (Brazilian	 rubber)	 for	 rubber	 were	 some	 of	 the	 triumphs	 of	 the	
network	 of	 collectors	 conveying	 plants	 to	 centers	 of	 calculation	 such	 as	 the	 Royal	
Botanical	 Gardens	 in	 Kew,	 England,	 from	 which	 the	 seeds	 were	 dispersed	 to	 parts	
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further	 afield	 for	 imperial	 cultivation.	 Such	 power	 came	 to	 shape	 the	 worldviews	 of	
colonial	rulers.	In	Nature’s	Government,	historian	Richard	Drayton	noted	that	since	the	
end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 Europeans	 believed	 that	 they	 possessed	 a	mastery	 of	
nature	that	would	deliver	the	“greatest	good	on	the	greatest	number”	 (Drayton	2000,	
xv).	 From	 merely	 coping	 with	 the	 maladies	 and	 trials	 of	 the	 exotic	 world,	 European	
practitioners	 refined	 their	 techniques	 and	 methods	 to	 the	 point	 where	 they	 could	
confidently	aim	to	accomplish	speculative	goals,	such	as	the	domestication	of	Hevea	 in	
Malaya.		
Until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 imperial	 plant	 sciences	were	 built	 on	 a	
string	of	botanical	gardens	in	various	colonies.	Within	the	British	Empire,	the	gardens	at	
Cape	 Town,	 Mauritius,	 Calcutta,	 and	 Peradeniya	 in	 Ceylon	 played	 important	 roles	 in	
plant	 transfer	and	acclimatization.	These	processes	operated	 in	a	 semiformal	network	
centered	 on	 Kew.	 Under	 the	 direction	 of	 energetic	 leaders,	 such	 as	 Joseph	 Banks,	
William	and	 Joseph	Hooker,	and	William	Thistleton-Dyer,	programs	were	 launched	 for	
obtaining	economically	important	plants	from	non-British	territories	for	transfer	to	sites	
under	British	control,	with	climates	prospectively	suited	to	their	growth.	The	transfer	of	
Hevea	Brasiliensis	to	Malaya	(Brockway	1979;	Grove	1995;	Drayton	2000;	Barnard	2016)	
was	one	such	successful	venture.	
By	 the	beginning	of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 two	major	developments	 in	 the	plant	
sciences	 had	 reshaped	 the	 practice	 of	 plant	 research	 in	 the	 colonial	 world.	 The	 first	
development	 was	 the	 rise	 of	 genetics.	 The	 term	 “genetics”	 was	 coined	 by	 William	
Bateson,	who	conducted	research	at	Cambridge	University,	at	the	time	when	the	papers	
written	by	Gregor	Mendel	 in	1865	and	 largely	neglected	until	 the	 turn	of	 the	 century	
reemerged	(Olby	1987;	Richmond	2001).	With	the	new	science	in	hand,	plants	could	be	
bred	for	desired	characteristics	with	greater	precision.	This	development	slotted	into	an	
already	 well-established	 tradition	 of	 research	 on	 plants	 with	 economic	 value	 to	
industrial	Europe,	but	at	the	same	time	the	institutional	structure	for	this	research	was	
also	evolving,	resulting	in	the	second	salient	development:	in	1898,	the	establishment	of	
the	 Imperial	 Department	 of	 Agriculture	 in	 Barbados	 heralded	 a	 shift	 in	 organization	
models	away	from	the	botanical	garden	toward	departments	of	agriculture	closely	tied	
to	the	bureaucracy	of	the	colonial	state	(Worboys	1979).	
Scholars	who	have	studied	the	history	of	the	sciences	in	colonies	have	questioned	
the	relevance	of	a	distinct	field	of	colonial	science.	Historian	Lewis	Pyenson	has	stated	
that	“a	sophisticated,	agricultural-experimentation	station	in	a	colony	may	contribute	to	
botanical	knowledge,	but	its	purpose	is	to	advance	local	production	and	export”	(1989,	
xiv).	For	that	reason,	he	believes	that	studies	of	colonial	science	should	avoid	the	taint	
of	becoming	 too	entangled	 in	 the	colonial	political	 and	economic	order	by	 redirecting	
attention	 to	 the	 “exact”	 (physical)	 sciences.	 In	 a	 related	 vein,	 historian	 Helen	 Tilley	
argues	 that	 there	 is	 no	 “colonial	 science”	 as	 such,	 because	Western	 science	 did	 not	
develop	in	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	world,	nor	did	the	sciences	in	the	colonies.	On	
that	basis,	there	is	no	essence	of	colonial	science	that	sets	it	apart	from	any	other	widely	
recognized	form	of	science	(Tilley	2011,	10–11).		
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An	underlying	tension	exists	in	this	field	concerning	whether	the	empirical	reality	of	
science,	 being	 about	 the	one	nature	 shared	by	 all	 nations	 and	peoples,	 should	define	
studies	such	as	this.	In	this	article,	I	present	a	case	that	demonstrates	how	sociopolitical	
arrangements	 within	 which	 colonial	 science	 was	 undertaken	 produced	 political	
economic	structures	that	were	distinctly	colonial.		
I	begin	with	a	discussion	of	the	ways	of	seeing	that	modern	states	adopted,	which	
in	colonial	sites	produced	and	reproduced	ideas	of	colonial	supremacy.	 I	 then	proceed	
to	the	case	of	Taiwan,	a	colonial	site	where	the	intensive	application	of	plant	sciences	in	
the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	transformed	rice	cultivation	and	enabled	farmers	
to	 produce	 the	 round-grain	 rice	 preferred	 by	 Japanese	 consumers.	 Once	 this	 was	
accomplished,	Taiwan	was	directed	by	its	Japanese	rulers	to	embrace	the	raison	d’être	
of	a	 rice	colony.	Taiwan’s	scientific	expertise	was	applied	to	 the	new	territories	 falling	
World	 War,	 the	 expertise	 acquired	 by	 Japanese	 scientists	 in	 shaping	 Taiwanese	 rice	
cultivation	was	redirected	toward	the	postwar	pro-American	order	 in	Asia,	now	under	
the	patronage	and	support	of	the	United	States.	
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 historical	 actors,	 the	 colonial	 nature	 of	 the	 polities	
where	 they	 served	 determined	 which	 sciences	 would	 proceed,	 which	 would	 be	
sidelined,	and	how	research	would	be	practiced.	Over	time,	the	dichotomization	of	the	
world	 between	 the	 advanced	 and	 the	 colonized	 is	 indispensable	 to	 understanding	
science	outside	the	Euro-American	“West”	as	colonies	evolved	into	developing	nations.	
	
Colonial	Ideology	and	Science	
	
The	 concept	 of	 “coloniality”	 refers	 to	 a	 state	 of	 consciousness	 that	 divides	 the	world	
between	the	West	and	the	non-West	and	confers	the	leadership	of	the	global	order	to	
the	former.	During	the	colonial	era		(from	the	1500s	to	the	1960s),	a	global	division	of	
labor	placed	 important	 industries	and	decision	making	 in	 the	 realm	of	 the	West	while	
assigning	 the	 work	 of	 extracting	 natural	 resources,	 sometimes	 through	 slavery	 or	
indenture,	to	what	we	now	call	the	Global	South	(Quijano	2000,	538).	The	dominance	of	
Western	 power	 was	 asserted	 through	 colonial	 capital.	 This	 colonial	 capital	 achieved	
supremacy	 by	 displacing	 other	 economic	 systems,	 such	 as	 the	 trade	 networks	 of	 the	
Malay	world	and	the	cloth	producers	of	South	Asia,	often	through	violent	and	coercive	
means.	Yet	over	time	the	coercive	process	was	elided.	Syed	Hussein	Alatas	argues	that	
colonial	 power	 conferred	 the	 status	 of	 superiority	 to	 the	 Western	 powers	 and	 their	
civilizations.	Europeans,	in	turn,	came	to	perceive	the	people	subjugated	to	their	rule	as	
indolent	and	lacking	in	industry	and	creativity	within	the	capitalist	world	system	(Alatas	
1977;	Baber	1998).	
In	an	essay	titled	“The	Question	Concerning	Technology,”	the	German	philosopher	
Martin	Heidegger	noted	 that,	upon	attaining	greater	knowledge	about	nature,	human	
societies	expected	technology	to	deliver	products	from	nature	with	surer	predictability.	
No	 longer	 were	 producers	 content	 to	 leave	 resource	 extraction	 to	 the	 vagaries	 of	
chance	and	nature;	production	techniques	would	“challenge	nature”	to	yield	its	value	on	
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demand,	on	the	basis	of	calculated	formulae	and	standardized	methods	of	observation	
(Heidegger	 1993;	 Scott	 1998).	 Combined	 with	 Alatas’s	 argument,	 I	 propose	 that	
technoscience	became	another	tool	in	the	kit	for	colonial	supremacy,	as	its	track	record	
of	past	success	became	justification	for	further	pursuit	along	the	same	lines.		
Colonial	 science	 could	 be	 deployed	 to	 enhance	 both	 the	 material	 and	 symbolic	
power	 of	 the	 colonizer.	 For	 example,	 the	 meteorological	 service	 reflected	 Japanese	
power	 on	 the	 Korean	 peninsula.	 Beginning	 as	 a	 rudimentary	 network	 of	 observation	
stations	serving	the	Japanese	military	during	the	Russo-Japanese	War	of	1904–1905,	the	
meteorological	service	expanded	to	improve	agricultural	efficiency	after	colonization.	It	
also	 symbolically	 displaced	 the	 Royal	 Observatory	 of	 the	 Korean	 Kings,	 thereby	
buttressing	 the	 ideology	 of	 Japanese	 imperial	 hegemony	 (Miyagawa	 2008).	
Corresponding	developments	in	Taiwan	enmeshed	the	island	colony	with	the	peninsular	
colony	 and	 the	 home	 islands	 (Zaiki	 2007).	 Similarly,	 in	 the	 field	 of	 agriculture	 the	
Japanese	in	Korea	established	an	agricultural	experiment	station	in	Suwon	and	nurtured	
indigenous	 agronomists	 who	 became	 the	 first	 generation	 of	 rice	 experts	 in	 the	
independent	Republic	of	Korea	(Kim	2018,	191).	
Colonial	 ideology	 provided	 both	 solution	 and	 justification	 for	 Japanese	 rule	 on	
Taiwan.	 Administrators	 in	 Taiwan	 explicitly	 tied	 coloniality	 and	 science	 together	 in	 a	
social-Darwinist	approach	to	developing	and	controlling	the	island	colony.	A	statement	
by	 Goto	 Shinpei,	 the	 Civil	 Administrator	 of	 the	 Government-General	 of	 Taiwan	 from	
1898	to	1906,	provides	insight:	
	
Any	 scheme	 of	 colonial	 administration,	 given	 the	 present	 advances	 in	
science,	 should	 be	 based	 on	 principles	 of	 Biology.	 What	 are	 these	
principles?	 They	 are	 to	 promote	 science,	 and	 to	 develop	 agriculture,	
industry,	 sanitation,	 education,	 communications	 and	 police	 force.	 If	
these	are	satisfactorily	accomplished,	we	will	be	able	to	preserve	in	the	
struggle	for	survival	and	win	the	struggle	for	the	“survival	of	the	fittest.”	
(Yao	2006,	45)	
	
Research	 aimed	 at	 revealing	 the	 nature	 of	 Taiwan—not	 only	 its	 geology,	 fauna,	
flora,	and	meteorology,	but	also	its	society—was	the	key	to	success	for	what	was,	at	the	
beginning	of	Shinpei’s	tenure,	a	struggling	colony.	Previously,	Taiwan	had	been	a	drain	
on	 Japanese	 finances	 due	 to	 the	 military	 operations	 launched	 to	 pacify	 the	 island.	
Continued	 colonization	was	 proving	 unpopular,	 and	 there	were	 even	 calls	 among	 the	
Japanese	public	to	give	it	up.	Shinpei	determined	to	turn	around	the	colony’s	finances	so	
that	it	would	earn	a	surplus	instead	of	draining	subsidies	from	the	central	government.	
On	 March	 22,	 1899,	 Shinpei	 obtained	 a	 bond	 issue	 of	 35	 million	 yen;	 as	 a	 result,	
development	expenditures	overtook	administrative	costs,	making	up	68	percent	of	the	
total	 government	 costs	 in	 the	 period	 1899–1905.	 The	 application	 of	 these	 funds	
generated	revenues	that	were	used	to	repay	the	debt.	One	key	initiative	was	to	conduct	
a	 land	 survey	 that	 enabled	 the	 government	 to	 collect	 property	 taxes	 efficiently.	 This	
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survey	confirmed	the	native	Taiwanese	tenants’	possession	of	the	land	they	farmed	and,	
as	 a	 result,	 expansive	 plantations	 under	 the	 ownership	 of	 colonial	 capitalists	 did	 not	
become	 a	 feature	 in	 Taiwan	 (Ka	 1995,	 51–52).	 Large	 plantations	 did	 not	 develop,	
because	 Japanese	 firms	 simply	 purchased	 the	 harvests	 from	 the	 farmers	 (Grajdanzev	
1942,	61).		
In	 1903,	 the	 government	 began	 the	 process	 of	 rationalizing	 the	 varieties	 of	 rice	
planted	 in	 Taiwan.	 Starting	 with	 a	 total	 of	 1,197	 local	 varieties,	 the	 government	
restricted	the	allowed	varieties	to	just	375,	and	each	village	was	permitted	to	select	only	
three	varieties.	According	to	Kim	Tae-Ho,	a	similar	pattern	of	coercion	existed	in	Korea	
under	 Japanese	 rule	 (Kim	2019).1	 The	government	 then	planted	 the	 three	varieties	 to	
yield	 seeds	 over	 four	 years,	 and	 when	 the	 desired	 seed	 supply	 was	 available,	 it	 was	
handed	to	the	farmers	(Mendiola	1949,	76).	This	process	eliminated	lower-yielding	local	
varieties	while	 retaining	those	with	higher	yields	 (Mendiola	1949,	77).	However,	while	
the	increased	output	of	Taiwanese	varieties	supplied	exports	to	Japan,	the	rice	did	not	
fetch	a	high	price	there.	After	Horai	rice	was	successfully	cultivated,	Taiwanese	farmers	
could	sell	it	for	a	higher	price	than	Taiwanese	varieties	in	the	main	islands,	though	it	was	
not	as	expensive	as	rice	grown	on	the	Japanese	home	islands	(Grajdanzev	1942,	53).	
Institutional	 arrangements	 for	 rice	 research	 were	 constructed	 to	 advance	 rice-
breeding.	 In	 1902,	 following	 the	 end	of	military	 action	 to	 pacify	 the	 island,	 governors	
from	the	districts	of	Taiwan	held	a	meeting	to	discuss	the	development	of	the	economy,	
including	 the	 topic	 of	 experimental	 farms.	 These	 discussions	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	
later	that	year	of	the	first	experiment	station,	which	eventually	employed	Eikichi	Iso,	in	
1912.	
Although	the	experimental	farms	demonstrated	the	colonial	state’s	commitment	to	
progress,	 Japanese-ruled	 Taiwan	 cannot	 be	 mistaken	 for	 a	 liberal	 nation-state.	 For	
example,	 the	 Imperial	University	of	Taihoku,	with	which	 Iso	was	affiliated,	was	all	but	
closed	to	Taiwanese	students.	Taiwanese	students	who	sought	higher	education	often	
went	to	Japan,	because	the	institutions	in	their	homeland	were	exclusively	for	Japanese	
students	 (Tsurumi	 1977).	 Despite	 being	 a	 state	 that	 was	 nominally	 committed	 to	
supporting	 Japanese	 capital,	 Taiwan’s	 rulers	did	not	 completely	 trust	 their	 compatriot	
businessmen	 to	 be	 responsible	 stewards	 of	 the	 island’s	 resources.	 In	 forestry,	 for	
example,	the	state	chose	to	invest	directly	in	commercial	forestry	operations	to	exploit	
forests	scientifically	and	sustainably	(Hung	2015).	It	is	within	this	context—a	financially	
solvent	colonial	state	with	an	active	posture	toward	science—that	Iso	came	to	Taiwan	to	
conduct	his	rice-breeding	experiments.	
	
	
	
                                                
1	Tae-Ho	Kim	notes	that	Korean	peasants	were	coerced	into	planting	new	varieties	scientifically	
developed	in	Japan	(2018,	191).	The	notable	difference	from	Taiwan	was	that,	because	of	the	
similarity	in	climate	between	the	home	islands	and	Korea,	the	tropical	adaptation	required	in	
Taiwan	was	not	necessary	in	Korea.	
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The	Science	That	Nurtured	Horai	Rice	in	Taiwan	
	
Eikichi	 Iso	 represented	 the	 breed	 of	 technical	 experts	who	would	make	 the	 Japanese	
Empire	modern	and	productive	(figure	1).	He	graduated	in	1911	from	what	was	then	the	
Tohoku	 Imperial	 University	 Faculty	 of	 Agriculture	 in	 Sapporo	 (renamed	 Hokkaido	
Imperial	University	 in	1918)	and	arrived	 in	Taiwan	in	1912,	 initially	at	the	Government	
Experimental	Farm	in	Taihoku.	In	1915,	working	in	Taichung,	a	research	team	including	
Iso	 developed	 the	 Taichu	 No.	 65	 variety	 of	 rice,	 which	 was	 a	 milestone	 in	 the	
development	of	Horai	rice	(see	figure	1).2	Horai	was	the	name	given	to	the	round-grain	
rice	 bred	 from	 crosses	 of	 Japonica	 and	 other	 varieties	 grown	 in	 Taiwan.	 In	 1919	 and	
1920,	the	Government-General	sent	Iso	to	Cornell	University	in	Ithaca,	New	York,	under	
appointment	as	an	overseas	investigator.	There	Iso	studied	plant	breeding	and	biological	
statistics	under	the	supervision	of	Professor	Harry	H.	Love.	
	
	
	
Figure	1.	Eikichi	Iso,	seated	at	right,	together	with	research	associates	at	an	agricultural	research	
laboratory	in	Taichung,	Taiwan.	Source:	Used	by	permission	of	the	NTU	Eikichi	Memorial	House.	
	
At	 this	 time,	 the	 United	 States	 saw	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 knowledge	 about	
photoperiodism,	 the	 effect	 of	 light	 exposure	on	 the	development	 of	 plants—	 findings	
that	had	an	impact	on	agriculture.	Photoperiodism	was	discovered	as	the	result	of	the	
experimental	 work	 of	 W.	 W.	 Garner	 and	 H.	 A.	 Allard,	 two	 scientists	 from	 the	 U.S.	
Department	 of	 Agriculture.	 According	 to	 Garner	 and	 Allard,	 the	 effect	 of	 light	 upon	
                                                
2	For	Iso,	see	http://iso-house.agron.ntu.edu.tw/iso.html.	Subsequent	findings	determined	that	
the	person	most	responsible	for	breeding	Taichu	No.	65	was	Jin	Suenaga:	
https://tw.appledaily.com/headline/daily/20131130/35474524/.	
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plants	could	be	measured	in	three	ways—intensity;	quality,	or	wavelength	of	radiation;	
and	the	duration	of	exposure	(Garner	and	Allard	1920,	553).	Their	focus	was	on	duration	
of	exposure,	for	it	appeared	that	plants	could	grow	optimally	with	less	than	full-strength	
daylight,	whereas	experiments	with	different	rays	from	different	parts	of	the	spectrum,	
such	as	ultraviolet,	yielded	indeterminate	results.	Garner	and	Allard	also	systematically	
eliminated	factors	such	as	water	and	temperature	by	means	of	other	experiments.	
Photoperiodism	 influenced	 Iso	 in	 his	 search	 for	 solutions	 for	 rice-breeding	
problems	in	Taiwan.	He	was	at	Cornell	when	this	discovery	came	to	light,	and	the	papers	
published	by	Garner	and	Allard	were	available	at	 the	University	of	Taihoku,	where	 Iso	
worked.	 Iso	 identified	the	ways	 in	which	photoperiodism	influenced	the	spread	of	rice	
cultivation	 to	 Japan.	His	 research	 into	 the	origins	of	 Japonica	varieties	 traced	 them	to	
three	basic	pedigrees:	Hyuga	or	Kasasa,	Izumo,	and	Koshi.	Iso	observed	that	in	the	three	
Japanese	provinces	of	San-in,	Kyushu,	and	Hokuriku,	the	rice	grown	could	be	traced	to	
these	three	pedigrees	(Iso	1954,	106–107).	He	theorized	that	the	spread	of	varieties	in	
Japan	had	been	possible	whenever	 the	day-length	 (hours	of	exposure	 to	daylight	 in	 a	
day)	 and	 temperature	 of	 the	 newly	 cultivated	 region	 matched	 that	 of	 the	 region	 of	
origin.	 Although	 the	 precise	 routes	 and	 periodicity	 of	 transmission	 could	 not	 be	
reconstructed,	 the	fact	 that	the	three	basic	pedigrees	were	widespread	gave	evidence	
to	a	diffusion	of	cultivation	from	the	earliest	site	to	the	latest.	As	Iso	explained,	through	
“the	 long	 natural	 and	 artificial	 selection”	 process,	 involving	 “mixing,	 natural	
hybridizations,	 segregations	 and	 recombinations”	 over	 centuries,	 “present	 varieties	
must	have	been	constructed”	(Iso	1954,	107).	
If	 that	 was	 indeed	 the	 history	 of	 rice	 in	 Japan,	might	 it	 not	 be	 the	 pathway	 for	
adapting	Japonica	varieties	to	Taiwan?	“There	is	an	indication	in	the	rice	plant	that	the	
action	 of	 its	 heading	 and	 ripening	 accelerates	 as	 the	 length	 of	 day	 becomes	 short,”	
began	 Iso’s	 description	 of	 the	 response	 of	 varieties	 of	 rice	 to	 different	 day-length	
conditions	(Iso	1954,	57).	Applied	to	Taiwan,	for	example,	the	native	varieties	planted	in	
the	 first	 crop	 would	 be	 weak	 in	 response	 to	 day-length	 and	 temperature.	 The	 dates	
when	the	tips	of	the	rice	plants,	known	as	heads,	began	to	emerge	were	recorded	as	the	
date	each	variety	began	heading.	These	varieties	would	be	planted	when	the	day-length	
is	 short	and	 temperature	 relatively	 low	 in	 the	early	part	of	 the	year,	and	would	begin	
heading	in	June	when	the	day-length	is	long	(13.16–13.65	hours)	and	temperature	high	
(26.6–27.3	degrees	Celsius,	or	79.88–81.14	Fahrenheit).	By	contrast,	varieties	chosen	for	
the	second	crop	would	have	a	strong	response	to	day-length	and	temperature	and	begin	
heading	later	 in	the	year	when	there	would	be	only	11.52–12.25	hours	of	daylight	(Iso	
1954,	58).	Thus,	the	territory	of	Taiwan	and	the	planting	materials	could	be	rationalized,	
mapping	 latitude	 to	 day-length,	 and	 genes	 to	 appropriate	 day-length	 and	
temperatures.3	
                                                
3	The	vulnerability	of	rice	plants	to	blast	disease	came	about	because	of	early	growth.	Japanese	
varieties	grown	on	Taiwan	matured	too	early	when	grown	according	to	normal	practice	and	
transplanted	at	40–60	days	of	age.	Iso	experimented	by	reducing	the	time	that	the	seedling	
spent	in	the	nursery	to	20–30	days.	This	difference	was	the	key	to	the	success	of	Horai	rice	
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Through	 this	 process	 of	 experimentation,	 Iso	 succeeded	 in	 producing	 Horai	 rice.	
The	 word	 horai	??	 was	 a	 neologism	 coined	 to	 name	 a	 new	 creation	 (in	Mandarin	
Chinese,	it	was	penglai;	in	vernacular	Taiwanese,	ponlai).	In	the	shared	mythology	of	the	
Japanese	 and	 Chinese	 cultures,	 the	 term	 refers	 to	 a	 paradisiacal	 mountain.	 Fittingly,	
Horai	was	also	an	archaic	Japanese	name	for	the	island	of	Taiwan	(Fujihara	2018,	143).It	
should	be	noted	 that	Horai	did	not	specify	a	particular	breed	or	crossbreed	of	 rice;	 in	
fact,	 as	 a	 category	 it	was	 a	 collection	 of	many	 glutinous	 and	 non-glutinous	 types	 (Iso	
1947,	 92).	 Promising	 candidates	were	 tested	 and	 further	 crossed	with	 other	 varieties	
selected	for	desirable	traits.	This	continuous	process	was	designed	to	bring	out	recessive	
traits,	as	well	as	to	transmit	known	traits	evident	in	the	phenotype	of	the	variety	being	
crossed	(Iso	1954,	132–133).	These	varieties	were	tested	in	different	locations	based	on	
qualities	that	suggested	a	particular	variety	was	well	suited	to	its	test	location.		
For	Taiwanese	rice	to	sell	on	the	Japanese	market,	a	length-breadth	ratio	of	1.6	was	
required.	 With	 this	 success,	 Taiwan	 became	 a	 rice	 producer	 for	 the	 Japanese	 home	
islands.	It	also	caused	significant	changes	in	the	island	colony’s	economic	position	within	
the	 empire	 and	 subsequently	 affected	 the	 political	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 colonial	 rulers	 of	
Taiwan.	
	
Horai	Cultivation	Transforms	Taiwan	
	
Technical	 advancement	 in	 the	 form	 of	 greater	 rice	 yields	 was	 a	 self-evident	 good	 in	
Eikichi	 Iso’s	 opinion,	 and	 scientific	 breeding	 had	 spread	 this	 boon	 to	 the	 Taiwanese	
farmer.	The	outstanding	Horai	variety	was	Taichu	No.	65.	It	was	grown	across	the	entire	
island,	unlike	many	others,	which	were	designated	 for	specific	places.	The	acreage	 for	
Taichu	No.	65	was	246,349	ko	(238,958	hectares,	about	590,478	acres)	in	1936.	This	was	
a	 cross	 of	 two	 Japanese	 varieties,	 Kameji	 and	 Shinriki,	 the	 original	 crossbreeding	 of	
which	was	performed	in	1923	(Iso	1954,	133–136).	Taichu	No.	65	also	became	a	popular	
parent	for	further	crossbred	varieties.	Farmers	voluntarily	attempted	to	try	growing	rice	
of	 even	better	 yield	 and	quality	 than	 the	Taichu	No.	65	 that	had	become	 symbolic	of	
Horai.	“They	were	so	willing	to	do	this	because	they	were	ambitious	to	have	their	own	
varieties	named	with	local	description	in	the	foreign	market,”	explained	Iso	(1954,	136).		
Horai	gave	an	increase	in	yield	of	2.5	to	4.4	times	over	indigenous	chailai	varieties	
of	rice.	But	production	costs	for	the	former	were	also	higher:	342	yen	per	ko	for	Horai	
over	 223.8	 yen	 for	 chailai.	 Some	 of	 these	 expenses	 came	 from	 the	 cost	 of	 access	 to	
irrigation	and	chemical	 fertilizers,	which	had	to	be	used	 instead	of	manure	due	to	the	
short	 nursery	 period.	 Products	 that	 used	 to	 be	 grown	 by	 the	 farmer	 now	 had	 to	 be	
                                                                                                                                   
(Mendiola	1949a,	78).	When	a	variety	known	as	Nakamura	developed	fast	and	headed	early	
under	the	short-day	(wintery)	conditions,	it	was	exposed	to	conditions	ideal	for	the	fungus-
caused	blast	disease.	By	comparison,	the	blast-resistant	varieties	developed	more	slowly	and,	as	
a	result,	passed	the	period	when	the	climate	was	most	conducive	to	the	disease	without	being	
exposed	to	it.	Iyosengoku	had	a	date	of	first	heading	of	June	16;	it	was	May	29	for	Nakamura,	
June	20	for	Yokichisen,	and	June	9	for	Aikawa	(Iso	1954,	113–114).	
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bought	 for	 cash.	 As	 noted	 by	 historian	 Andrew	 Grajdanzev,	 “the	 expansion	 of	 area	
under	 Horai	 is	 therefore	 not	 so	 much	 a	 sign	 of	 prosperity,	 as	 it	 would	 at	 first	 sight	
appear,	as	a	sign	of	the	growing	need	of	the	farmer	to	pay	taxes,	to	pay	for	 irrigation,	
and	 to	 pay	 for	 the	 tobacco	 which	 he	 formerly	 produced	 himself	 (and	 is	 now	 a	 state	
monopoly)”	(1942,	55).	
The	 nature	 of	 colonial	 technological	 improvement	 was	 to	 enmesh	 farmers	more	
tightly	within	the	structure	of	the	colonial	economy.	Cash-based	transactions,	credit	to	
facilitate	the	higher	cost	of	production,	dependence	on	physical	 infrastructure	such	as	
irrigation	 and	 transportation,	 and	 penetration	 by	 technical	 extension	 officers	 and	
researchers	such	as	Iso	transformed	agricultural	practice.	The	calendar	of	the	Taiwanese	
rice	farmer	became	synchronized	with	that	of	the	Japanese,	for	the	first	harvest	of	Horai	
between	 June	 and	 October	 relieved	 food	 shortages	 in	 the	 home	 islands	 as	 it	 was	 a	
winter	crop	that	could	not	be	grown	in	the	harsher	climate	of	more	northerly	latitudes	
(Ka	1995,	168).	
Horai	cultivation	upset	the	colonial	political	economy	by	 initially	benefiting	native	
Taiwanese	 farmers	 at	 some	 expense	 to	 Japanese-owned	 sugar	 factories.	 Japanese	
capital	chased	after	investment	opportunities	outside	the	home	islands	from	the	1910s	
onward,	 as	 profits	 declined	 at	 home.	 The	 Taiwanese	 sugar	 industry	 offered	 such	
opportunities,	but	there	were	barriers	to	entry.	Locally	owned	mills	competed	intensely	
for	raw	cane	and	drove	prices	high	in	1904	and	1905.	This	competition	changed	under	
new	regulations.	 In	1905,	all	cane-growing	farmers	were	required	to	sell	their	produce	
exclusively	 to	 a	 designated	 sugar	 factory	 in	 their	 respective	 area.	 In	 addition,	 the	
opening	of	new	mills	was	subject	 to	government	approval,	 thus	preventing	Taiwanese	
producers	from	expanding	(Ka	1995,	79).	
The	pricing	mechanism	 for	 cane	was	 regulated	 to	 favor	 Japanese	 sugar	 factories.	
Prior	to	Japanese	rule,	a	sugar-sharing	system	operated	such	that	a	portion	of	sugar	was	
returned	 to	 the	 farmer	 after	deducting	 the	 cost	of	 processing.	After	 colonization,	 this	
payment	in	kind	was	changed	to	cash	payment.	The	imposition	of	regulations	known	as	
“measures	 for	 balancing	 the	 price	 between	 rice	 and	 sugar”	 established	 a	 new	 price-
setting	mechanism.	Instead	of	linking	the	price	of	cane	to	sugar,	mills	now	paid	farmers	
an	amount	that	was	based	on	rice	prices	instead.	At	the	time,	rice	was	chailai,	the	Indica	
varieties	primarily	consumed	locally	(Ka	1995,	115).	
In	 1918,	 rice	 riots	 in	 Japan	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 food	 supplies	 as	 Japan	
underwent	social	changes	due	to	industrialization	and	urbanization.	Government	policy	
began	 to	 favor	 importation	 of	 rice	 from	 the	 colonies	 of	 Taiwan	 and	 Korea	 (Ka	 1995,	
134).	This	policy	change	coincided	with	the	successful	breeding	of	Horai	rice,	which	put	
Taiwan	 in	 a	 position	 to	 satisfy	 Japanese	 consumers.	 The	 rice	 buyers	 operated	 as	
competitive	firms,	unlike	the	sugar	factories,	which	were	monopsony	buyers	protected	
by	the	state.	As	a	 result,	Horai	prices	rose	and	attracted	more	 farmers	 to	switch	 from	
chailai.	These	conditions	depressed	the	supply	of	chailai	 just	when	demand	for	it	rose,	
because	the	Horai	farmers	were	selling	their	crops	for	export	and	needed	chailai	rice	for	
their	own	consumption	(Ka	1995,	139).	
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Because	the	pricing	mechanism	for	cane	purchase	was	based	on	chailai	prices,	after	
1925	 the	 factories	 had	 to	pay	more	 for	 their	 raw	materials.	 As	 the	price	of	 rice	 rose,	
farmers	shifted	away	from	cane	farming,	thus	reducing	supply	for	the	sugar	factories	(Ka	
1995,	161).	As	a	consequence,	Taiwan	became	less	attractive	as	a	site	of	investment	for	
Japanese	capital.	Disputes	between	farmers	and	factory	owners	over	the	price	of	sugar	
were	 frequent,	 but	 the	 factory	 owners	 sustained	 the	 practice	 of	 buying	 from	 farmers	
instead	of	running	their	own	plantations,	as	this	was	more	profitable	under	the	regime	
enforced	in	the	colony	(Grajdanzev	1942,	61).	
The	farmers	exercised	their	agency	in	the	degree	of	investment	that	they	applied	to	
their	fields.	Economists	Elliott	Fan	and	Shu-jen	Yeh	note,	for	example,	that	more	secure	
tenancy	encouraged	farmers	to	invest	 in	 irrigation	facilities	but	at	the	same	time	were	
not	 induced	 to	 increase	 fertilizer	 use;	 fertilizers	 did	 not	 have	 a	 long-term	 effect	 on	
output,	resulting	in	an	indifference	to	application	of	that	input	under	the	secure	tenancy	
arrangement	 (Fan	 and	 Yeh	 2017,	 14).	 Thus,	 farmers	 in	 colonial	 Taiwan	 could	 exercise	
their	agency	in	response	to	state	policy.	
The	 Japanese	 capitalists	 sought	 government	 assistance	 to	 curtail	 the	 increase	 in	
rice	 prices	 and	production.	 Although	 the	Government-General	 had	usually	 helped	 the	
sugar	industry,	the	geopolitical	situation	was	changing	as	crop	failures	in	Japan	and	war	
in	the	later	1930s	altered	the	balance	of	 interests	 in	the	metropolis.	The	Government-
General	desired	a	policy	 that	would	both	 secure	 sufficient	 rice	production	and	ensure	
low	prices	(Ka	1995,	163–165).	The	 implementation	of	a	government	monopoly	of	the	
Taiwanese	rice	trade	coincided	with	a	13-percent	drop	in	the	price	of	rice	in	1939.	This	
drop	may	have	helped	the	sugar	producers,	but	it	also	necessitated	a	state	intervention	
to	stabilize	a	society	in	the	midst	of	a	turbulent	period	in	world	affairs.	
The	 entrance	 of	 an	 alternative	 commodity	 crop	 with	 a	 ready	 market	 in	 Japan	
unbalanced	 the	 calibrated	 mechanisms	 in	 place	 in	 Taiwan	 to	 boost	 the	 sugar	
manufacturers’	 profits.	 The	 Government-General	 faced	 the	 arduous	 task	 of	 keeping	
sugar	producers’	profits	high	while	ensuring	that	the	native	smallholding	farms	were	not	
driven	 to	 ruin.	As	 Japan’s	 home	 islands	 increasingly	 came	 to	 rely	 on	 rice	 imports,	 the	
state	 also	 had	 the	 added	 task	 of	 ensuring	 stable	 supplies	 of	 rice	 to	 the	 home	 islands	
without	 allowing	prices	 to	 skyrocket.	 In	 this	way,	Horai	 came	 to	occupy	 an	 important	
position	in	the	Taiwanese	Government-General’s	perspective,	as	it	 identified	itself	as	a	
rice	colony.		
	
A	Taiwanese	Subempire	Built	on	Rice	Expertise	
	
Tropicality	was	a	central	feature	of	Taiwan	in	the	eyes	of	Japan.	Taiwan’s	climate	made	
it	 an	 ideal	 site	 for	 sugar	 cultivation.The	 production	 of	 sugar	 alleviated	 the	 balance	 of	
Japan’s	 trade	deficit.	 In	 the	earlier	phases	of	 colonization,	Taiwan	had	been	seen	as	a	
site	of	curiosities	to	be	studied	scientifically	 in	order	to	make	it	function	as	part	of	the	
growing	Japanese	polity.	This	ideological	setting,	guided	by	the	“principles	of	Biology”	in	
Goto	 Shinpei’s	 words,	 was	 the	 site	 of	 Eikichi	 Iso’s	 experiments	 to	 breed	 Japanese	
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varieties	of	rice.	The	success	of	breeding	rice,	together	with	that	of	the	more	established	
crop	of	 cane,	 gave	Taiwan	an	 identity	as	a	producer	of	 commodities	 for	 the	 Japanese	
imperial	economy.	As	the	Japanese	Empire	expanded,	Taiwan’s	perceived	specialism	in	
tropical	agriculture	translated	into	a	“subimperial	sphere	of	influence	in	South	China	and	
Southeast	Asia”	for	the	Government-General	(Schneider	1998,	i).	
The	 vehicle	 for	 the	 fulfillment	 of	 these	 subimperial	 ambitions	 was	 the	 Taiwan	
Development	 Corporation	 (1936–1946)	 owned	 by	 the	Government-General	 of	 Taiwan	
and	 engaged	 primarily	 in	 mining	 activities	 in	 Indochina	 and	 agriculture	 in	 Hainan.	 In	
Japanese,	 this	 entity	 was	 known	 as	 Taiwan	 Takushoku	 Kabushiki	 Kaisha,	 or	 Taitaku.	
Owned	 and	 supported	 by	 the	 government	 of	 Taiwan,	 Taitaku	 was	 a	 business	 that	
competed	with	other	Japanese	firms,	whether	privately	owned	or	state-controlled,	with	
the	 goal	 of	 inducing	 industrialization	 in	 Taiwan	 through	 the	 benefit	 of	 an	 economic	
hinterland	carved	out	of	the	new	territories	conquered	by	the	Japanese	military	in	Asia	
(Schneider	1998,	i).	
Subimperialism	 implied	 that	 the	 colony	 emerging	 as	 the	 sub-metropolis	 had	
interests	 of	 its	 own,	 distinct	 from	 the	metropolis,	 and	 had	 the	means	 to	 protect	 and	
expand	 its	 powers	 even	 within	 a	 relationship	 that	 was	 formally	 dependent	 upon	 the	
metropolis.	The	Government-General	found	itself	in	a	stronger	position	when	it	was	no	
longer	 dependent	 on	 subsidies	 after	 1905.	 The	 developmental	 agenda	 of	 building	
irrigation	 and	 transport	 links	 and	 funding	 agricultural	 research	 could	 be	 pursued	
through	 its	 own	 means.	 The	 success	 of	 Horai	 as	 an	 export	 commodity	 to	 Japan	
demonstrated	the	potential	for	technoscientific	development	to	disrupt	Taiwan’s	terms	
of	 trade	with	 the	mother	country.	 In	short,	Taiwan	was	acquiring	political	agency	as	a	
result	of	scientific	research	capabilities.	
The	draft	plan	for	a	“Taiwan	Development	and	Industrial	Corporation”	prepared	in	
1919	for	Governor-General	Akashi	Motojiro	was	an	early	proposal	 for	a	state-financed	
corporation	 for	 development	 purposes.	 Its	 aim	 was	 to	 provide	 financing	 for	 land	
development	projects	too	difficult	for	private	firms	to	undertake,	and	to	be	involved	in	
projects	around	South	China	and	Southeast	Asia	(Schneider	1998,	34).	This	basic	concept	
was	discussed	until	1936.		
Commentators	 noted	 that	 research	 about	 the	 region	 would	 be	 essential	 to	
Taiwan’s	interests.	A	1922	article	in	the	Taiwan	Review	(Taiwan	jiho),	the	official	organ	
of	the	Government-General,	called	for	a	tropical	research	institute	to	conduct	economic	
and	 commercial	 information-gathering	 and	 scientific	 research.	 The	 next	 year,	 another	
article	 called	 for	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 economic	 research	 unit	 in	 the	Government-
General	that	would	have	its	own	commercial	officers	posted	at	Japanese	consulates	 in	
South	 China	 and	 Southeast	 Asia.	 (Schneider	 1998,	 34).	 Goto	 Shinpei’s	 policy	 aim—to	
accumulate	data	for	more	effective	control—was	now	training	the	gaze	of	the	Japanese	
in	Taiwan	beyond	the	island’s	shores.	
For	a	time,	the	confluence	of	opposing	factors	prevented	the	establishment	of	such	
an	 organization.	 These	 factors	 might	 be	 parties	 with	 contesting	 interests	 or	 an	
unfavorable	 economic	 climate.	 Factors	 in	 favor	 of	 this	 organization	 finally	 aligned	
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around	 1935	 as	 both	 the	 Colonial	 Ministry	 and	 the	 Government-General	 of	 Taiwan	
developed	reasons	to	rally	around	the	concept.	For	the	Colonial	Ministry,	established	in	
1929,	such	a	project	would	give	it	greater	visibility	and	influence	in	policy.	At	the	time,	
its	 actual	 powers	were	 limited	 due	 to	 competing	ministries	 with	 different	 spheres	 of	
influence,	 such	 as	 the	military’s	 control	 of	 affairs	 in	Manchuria,	 and	 also	 because	 the	
Governments-General	of	Korea	and	Taiwan	had	substantial	autonomy	(Schneider	1998,	
48).	By	1936,	there	was	talk	of	scrapping	the	ministry	altogether.	
In	1935,	 the	Government-General	held	a	“Tropical	 Industry	Research	Conference”	
in	 conjunction	 with	 the	 fortieth	 anniversary	 of	 Taiwan’s	 colonization	 by	 Japan.	 For	
Taiwan,	the	conference	was	an	opportunity	to	publicize	the	achievements	in	economic	
development	on	 the	 island	colony	 (Schneider	1998,	50).	At	 the	conference,	Governor-
General	 Nakagawa	 Kenzo	 raised	 the	 concept	 of	 a	 nanshin,	 or	 southern	 sphere	 of	
influence,	 that	 Taiwan	and	 the	Ministry	of	 Colonial	Affairs	would	 jointly	 develop.	 This	
was	 to	 be	 the	 next	 logical	 step	 following	 the	 rapid	 development	 of	 Taiwan	 under	
Japanese	rule,	one	that	would	connect	the	rich	resources	of	South	China	and	Southeast	
Asia	to	the	industrializing	sub-metropolis	of	Taiwan.	
In	 Taiwan	 itself,	 the	 company	 engaged	 in	 land	 management,	 chemical	
manufacturing,	and	forestry.	The	company	was	started	with	the	Government-General’s	
contribution	of	15,000	ko	(14,550	hectares,	or	35,954	acres)	of	land	and	an	issue	of	the	
shares	 not	 held	 by	 the	 state	 that	 raised	 3.75	 million	 yen,	 mostly	 from	 Japanese	
companies	and	Japanese	individuals	(Schneider	1998,	69–71).	Outside	the	island	colony,	
the	 major	 projects	 undertaken	 by	 Taitaku	 were	 iron	 mining	 in	 Indochina	 starting	 in	
1937,	 which	 expanded	 to	 other	 minerals	 such	 as	 nickel	 and	 phosphate	 in	 1941	
(Schneider	 1998,	 197),	 and	 agricultural	 production	 on	 the	 island	 of	 Hainan.	 Other	
projects	 included	 jute	 production	 in	 Indochina,	 forestry	 in	 the	 Andaman	 Islands,	 and	
other	 agricultural	production	 in	 the	Dutch	East	 Indies	 and	 the	Philippines.	 The	mining	
activities	were	meant	to	provide	raw	materials	for	the	development	of	Taiwanese	metal	
industries,	while	rice	farming	especially	would	take	advantage	of	the	experience	gained	
from	the	development	of	Taiwan	itself.	
Hainan	 was	 meant	 to	 become	 a	 “second	 Taiwan”	 through	 Taitaku’s	 program	 of	
development	 (Schneider	 1998,	 230).	 After	 the	 Japanese	 Navy	 seized	 the	 island	 in	
February	 1939,	 the	 intention	 was	 to	 transform	 it	 into	 a	 colony	 of	 Japan,	 much	 like	
Taiwan.	 One	 problem	 was	 that	 Hainan	 was	 a	 rice	 importer,	 as	 its	 agriculture	 and	
communications	 infrastructures	 were	 not	 developed	 enough	 to	 support	 a	 productive	
rice-farming	 sector.	Hainan’s	 geographical	 location	was	of	 strategic	 importance	 to	 the	
navy,	so	food	security	was	an	added	incentive	to	develop	its	agricultural	capacity.	
Taitaku	had	already	outlined	a	plan	for	agriculture	in	Hainan	before	the	occupation	
proper	began.	Food	and	other	crops	expected	to	be	readily	profitable	were	prioritized.	
Land	would	be	acquired	and	thence	 leased	to	tenant	farmers,	reflecting	Taitaku’s	own	
function	 as	 a	 major	 landlord	 in	 Taiwan.	 Taitaku	 operated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
experimentation	and	 localization	first;	 it	had	 its	own	nurseries	 for	producing	seeds	 for	
distribution	to	Japanese	military	units	located	near	each	nursery	(Schneider	1998,	252–253).		
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Horai	rice	proved	to	be	a	qualified	success	in	Hainan.	Although	its	introduction	did	
increase	output	significantly,	wartime	conditions	meant	that	supplies	of	 fertilizer	were	
limited.	Further,	it	required	the	tenant	farmers	to	follow	the	same	techniques	practiced	
in	Taiwan.	In	1940,	the	first	experimental	plantings	showed	that	certain	Horai	varieties	
yielded	two	to	three	times	that	of	 indigenous	Hainanese	rice.	Under	actual	production	
conditions,	however,	only	the	fields	directly	managed	by	Taitaku	produced	the	superior	
yields	expected	of	Horai	crops	(Schneider	1998,	257).		
The	“invention”	of	Horai	rice	provided	a	sense	of	mission	to	the	administrative	class	
of	 the	 Government-General,	 creating	 a	 new	 identity	 for	 Taiwan	 as	 a	 rice	 colony.	
Although	domestic	tensions	arose	from	conflicts	between	sugar	producers	and	farmers,	
and	the	need	to	protect	Japanese	capitalist	interests	through	price	controls,	the	aspect	
of	 Taiwan	 facing	 the	 rest	 of	 the	empire	was	 that	of	 a	 rice	 colony,	 developed	 through	
assiduous	 investments	 in	 scientific	 research,	 land	 reclamation,	 and	 irrigation	 works.	
Policy	 framing	 and	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 Government-General’s	 interests	 in	 the	
expanding	empire	were	focused	on	its	proclaimed	expertise	in	rice	production.		
	
Applying	Taiwanese	Rice	Knowledge	to	Asia	
	
After	mastering	rice-breeding	in	Taiwan,	Eikichi	Iso	was	able	to	apply	this	knowledge	to	
similar	 ventures	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 Asia.	 A	 common	 theme	 in	 his	 descriptions	 of	 rice	
regions	encompassed	the	two	fundamentals,	variety	type	and	day-length.	When	trained	
upon	China,	 his	 insights	 highlighted	 the	 similarities	 between	 the	mainland	 and	 Japan,	
mapping	 both	 varieties	 and	 geographies	 to	 read	 the	 unfamiliar	 Chinese	 mainland	
through	referents	from	the	Japanese	main	islands.	
According	 to	 Iso,Chinese	 rice	was	 of	 the	Hsien	 and	Keng	 non-glutinous	 varieties,	
respectively	 Indica	and	Japonica	domesticated	 in	Taiwan	before	Japanese	rule.	Taiwan	
also	had	varieties	of	glutinous	rice	called	Nuo,	with	both	 Indica	Nuo	and	Japonica	Nuo	
types.	Whereas	in	Japan	there	were	only	Japonica	varieties	of	rice,	those	in	China	were	
mostly	Indica.	In	Japan,	non-glutinous	varieties	were	Uruchi,	while	glutinous	ones	were	
called	Mochi.	With	reference	to	rice-growing	in	Kiangsu	and	Chekiang,	Iso	noted	that	the	
varieties	 in	 these	parts	of	China	had	a	 response	 to	 “light	 and	 temperature”	 similar	 to	
that	 demonstrated	 by	 varieties	 grown	 in	 Kyushu	 and	 the	 southern	 parts	 of	 central	
Japan.	As	a	result,	experimental	plantings	of	“Shinriki,	a	Japanese	variety”	grew	well	 in	
Hangchow	(Iso	1954,	76).	
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Shinriki	 was	 a	 parent	 to	 the	 popular	 Taichu	 No.	 65	 Horai	
variety.	Its	introduction	thus	represented	the	scientific	prospecting	of	territory	on	which	
Japan	had	designs.	Just	as	finding	ecological	niches	conducive	to	Japanese	rice	had	made	
Taiwan	a	successful	rice-producing	colony,	matching	new	territory	to	Taiwanese	regions	
could	perform	the	same	role	as	Japanese	rule	extended	to	more	of	the	mainland.	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 Government-General’s	 designs	 on	 mainland	 China,	 plans	 for	
southward	 expansion	 also	 posed	 technical	 challenges	 to	 the	 Japanese	 imperial	 rice	
scientist.	 The	 farther	 south	 the	 latitude	 of	 a	 region	 was	 with	 respect	 to	 Kyushu,	 the	
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harder	 it	 was	 to	 recreate	 conditions	 suitable	 for	 varieties	 of	 rice	 familiar	 to	 the	
Japanese.	 Two	 technical	 approaches	 could	 be	 attempted.	 In	 the	 first	 approach,	 the	
period	in	the	nursery	would	be	reduced	to	the	extreme	through	the	use	of	fertilizers	in	
order	 to	 take	 full	 advantage	 of	 the	 short	 day-length	 in	 the	 southern	 latitudes	 that	
promoted	the	growth	and	development	of	Japanese	varieties.	In	the	second	approach,	
varieties	 less	 sensitive	 to	 day-length	 and	 temperature	 would	 need	 to	 be	 developed,	
possibly	 through	 crossbreeding	with	 Japanese	 varieties	 in	 a	 repetition	 of	 the	 process	
through	which	Horai	had	been	conceived.	
From	 the	 sub-metropolis	 of	 Taiwan,	 Iso’s	 base	 in	 Taihoku	 became	 a	 center	 of	
calculation	and	collecting	data	from	various	parts	of	Asia,	including	the	Japanese	home	
islands.	 The	 harvest	 of	 the	 first	 Taiwanese	 crop	 arrived	 in	 Japan	 in	 time	 to	 alleviate	
shortages,	 because	 Japan	 could	 not	 sow	 its	 own	 rice	 during	 its	 harsh	 winter.	 For	
example,	on	pages	77–79	of	his	book,	Rice	Crops	in	Its	[sic]	Rotation	in	Subtropical	Zones	
(1954),Iso	 presented	 “The	 recommended	 varieties	 of	 the	 rice	 plant	 in	 China”	 and	
“Temperature,	 rainfall,	 humidity	 &	 days	 free	 of	 frost	 in	 the	 agricultural	 regions	 of	
China.”	On	page	124,	 a	 table	 showing	 “Day-length	&	 Temperature	of	Hokkaido	&	 the	
First	 Crop	 Season	 of	 Taiwan”	 noted	 the	 asynchronous	 crop	 cycle	 between	 these	 two	
Japanese	territories	at	the	extreme	latitudes	of	the	pre-1937	empire,	with	the	Hokkaido	
crop	being	sown	in	April–May	and	the	Taiwan	crop	in	January,	and	ready	to	harvest	in	
September–October	and	June,	respectively.		
Limited	capital	was	a	constraint	 in	the	colonization	schemes	of	 Imperial	 Japan.	As	
the	empire	expanded	into	the	mainland	after	1937,	this	issue	became	ever	more	severe.	
The	 struggle	 to	 transform	 Hainan	 into	 a	 “Second	 Taiwan”	 serves	 as	 a	 cautionary	
example.	In	addition	to	the	failure	to	spread	the	cultivation	of	Horai	island-wide,	despite	
initial	 success	 at	 the	 Taitaku-farmed	 nurseries	 on	 Hainan,	 development	 plans	 were	
hindered	 by	 shortages	 of	 such	 basic	 resources	 as	 trucks.	 No	 doubt,	 war	 conditions	
worsened	 such	 problems,	 but	 even	 under	 the	 relative	 peace	 of	 the	 prewar	 period,	
Taiwanese	development	was	not	 lavishly	capital-intensive.	Agriculture	remained	highly	
manual	 and	 made	 use	 of	 basic	 equipment	 that	 was	 handcrafted	 rather	 than	 mass-
produced.	 These	 “traditional”	 implements	 operated	 in	 conjunction	 with	 chemical	
fertilizers	 and	 precise	 timing	 and	 irrigation	 to	 present	 a	 model	 colonial	 agricultural	
system	that	was	a	hybrid	of	technoscience	and	preindustrial	craft.	
It	should	come	as	no	surprise,	then,	that	Iso’s	observations	of	Southeast	Asian	rice-
culturing	 methods	 paid	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 craft	 aspects	 of	 their	 agriculture.	 For	
example,	Iso	noted	that	in	Malaya	“a	peculiar	seed-bed	and	transplanting”	method	was	
in	 use.	 This	 method,	 a	 floating	 nursery,	 was	 implemented	 because	 the	 rice-planting	
districts	were	very	well	watered.	 This	nursery	was	made	by	 laying	 thick	mud	on	piled	
rush	grass	to	make	a	bed	for	the	seedlings.	As	more	water	entered	the	field,	more	grass	
or	 straw	 was	 piled	 underneath	 to	 further	 elevate	 the	 seedbed.	 The	 seedlings	 were	
transplanted	twice	into	secondary	nurseries	so	that	the	total	period	in	the	nursery	was	
from	60	to	90	days,	far	longer	than	the	practice	in	Taiwan	(Iso	1954,	161).	This	type	of	
knowledge	 was	 essential	 as	 the	 extreme	 rainfall	 of	 monsoon	 regions	 coupled	 with	
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winterless	 years	 presented	 unknown	 challenges	 to	 Japanese	 imperial	 scientists.	 Their	
experience	 with	 Taiwan,	 where	 a	 hybrid	 approach	 adapted	 traditional	 techniques	 to	
harness	the	benefits	of	modern	breeds	and	infrastructure,	meant	that	they	expected	to	
derive	value	from	absorbing	knowledge	about	various	forms	of	indigenous	agriculture.	
Japanese	imperial	agriculture	in	the	period	from	the	1930s	to	1945	did	not	feature	
mechanization,	 so	 the	 particular	 methods	 of	 agriculture	 adapted	 to	 environments	 in	
Southeast	 Asia	 continued	much	 as	 they	 had	 before	 Japanese	 rule.	 In	 a	 very	 different	
situation	at	a	later	stage	of	development	in	the	1970s,	World	Bank	financing	eventually	
extended	the	use	of	tractors	and	combine	harvesters	to	Malaysia,	along	with	other	parts	
of	 Southeast	 Asia,	 and	 created	 significant	 inequalities	 of	 access	 to	 capital	 and	
opportunity.4	
Iso’s	“anthropological	approach”	to	explaining	agricultural	practices	was	a	function	
of	 the	 limits	 of	 modern	 Japanese	 imperial	 agriculture.	 It	 was	 understood	 that	 Japan,	
being	unable	to	afford	methods	that	could	more	effectively	dominate	the	terrain,	would	
have	an	approach	of	limited	modernity	still	dependent	on	human	and	animal	power	and	
making	use	of	 homemade	 straw	and	wood	 implements	 for	 some	 functions	 instead	of	
factory-made	tools.	However,	Japan’s	approach	was	a	practical	modernity	that	delivered	
on	what	counted	the	most:	yields	and	productivity.	This	simple	mantra	of	progress	was	
the	 essence	 of	 colonial	 science.	 As	 long	 as	 this	 practice	 delivered	 substantial	
improvements,	 it	 was	 not	 invalidated	 by	 the	 compromises	 that	 it	 had	 to	 make	 with	
respect	to	capital.	
	
From	Imperial	Rice	Research	to	Postwar	International	Cooperation	
	
After	 the	war,	 Japanese	 technocrats	 sought	 to	 translate	 the	experience	of	 developing	
Horai	into	a	roadmap	for	Asian	agricultural	development.	A	compilation	of	the	technical	
and	 institutional	history	of	 Japanese	rice	research,	A	Century	of	Agricultural	Growth	 in	
Japan:	 Its	Relevance	to	Asian	Development,	was	meant	to	demonstrate	how	this	could	
be	accomplished.	The	preface	 states	 that	 the	book’s	purpose	 is	 to	provide	“a	positive	
economic	 analysis	 of	 the	 long-term	 growth	 of	 Japanese	 agriculture”	 in	 order	 to	
“facilitate	 a	 correct	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 and	 magnitude	 of	 the	 problems	 of	
agricultural	 development	 in	 Asia	 today”	 (Hayami	 et	 al.	 1975,	 xv).	 The	 book	 focuses	
primarily	on	 the	experience	of	 rice	 research	and	 the	development	of	 its	 cultivation	 in	
Japan	proper	 from	 the	beginning	of	 the	Meiji	 Restoration	 to	 the	mid-1970s.	 Featured	
topics	 include	 economic	 trend	 data,	 a	 chronology	 of	 institutions	 founded	 for	 rice	
research	 and	 extension	 in	 Japan,	 and	 evaluations	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 technology,	
infrastructure,	and	rice-breeding	research.	 It	 is	noteworthy	that	only	 in	the	concluding	
chapter	is	the	colonial	experience	in	Taiwan	explicitly	highlighted	as	a	possible	Japanese	
contribution	to	rice	agriculture	in	Asia.	
                                                
4	Political	scientist	James	C.	Scott’s	Weapons	of	the	Weak	(1985)	provides	an	account	of	some	of	
the	changes	brought	by	mechanization	in	rice	farms	in	Kedah,	Northern	Peninsular	Malaysia.	
	
Wei	Yi	Leow	
Cross-Currents	33	|	48	
The	authors	classify	the	technological	changes	brought	by	Japanese	colonial	rule	to	
Taiwan	and	Korea	as	“land-saving”	and	describe	them	as	a	transplantation	of	methods	
that	had	been	developed	in	Meiji	Japan:	the	changes	took	the	form	of	“local	adaptation	
of	 a	 technology	 of	 Japanese	 origin	 (embodied	 typically	 in	 improved	 seeds)”	 and	
“investment	 in	 irrigation	 facilities	 as	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 the	 diffusion	 of	 the	 new	
technology”	 (Hayami	 et	 al.	 1975,	 204).	 The	 book	 goes	 on	 to	 note	 that,	 as	 land	 was	
plentiful	 in	 the	 Philippines	 until	 about	 1960,	 production	 could	 be	 increased	 through	
reclaiming	 new	 land.	 However,	 as	 the	 frontier	 closed,	 the	 land-saving	 technologies	
mentioned	became	increasingly	relevant	to	the	Philippines’	needs	(Hayami	et	al.	1975,	
204).	
As	explained	in	this	book,	the	introduction	of	Horai	varieties	in	Taiwan	met	with	a	
bottleneck	 as	 irrigation	 facilities	 were	 well	 developed	 only	 in	 parts	 of	 Taiwan	 and	
progressedover	 time	 as	 the	 irrigation	 system	 expanded	 under	 colonial	 development	
schemes.	The	authors	state,	“It	appears	that	the	construction	of	the	irrigation	system	in	
Taiwan	was,	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 induced	by	 the	profitability	 of	 such	 investments	which	
was	 increased	by	 the	 technological	 breakthrough”	of	Horai	 (Hayami	 et	 al.	 1975,	 213–
214).	The	lesson	here	is	that	agricultural	development	was	a	system	and	not	a	collection	
of	disparate	projects.	The	essential	catalyst	 in	 this	case	was	a	planting	material	with	a	
substantial	and	lucrative	market,	which	in	turn	needed	to	be	backed	by	the	support	of	
products	 such	as	 fertilizers,	and	by	 infrastructures	 for	 irrigation	and	 transportation.	 In	
this	sense,	we	could	consider	rice-breeding	research	a	means	of	achieving	unbalanced	
growth,	 as	 advancement	 in	 one	 sector	 dragged	 others	 forward,	 as	 described	 by	
economist	Albert	O.	Hirschman	(1958).	
It	would	 seem	natural,	 then,	 that	 Yujiro	Hayami,	 the	 lead	author	 and	editor	of	A	
Century	 of	 Agricultural	 Growth	 in	 Japan,	 was	 based	 in	 the	 Philippines,	 at	 the	
International	 Rice	 Research	 Institute	 (IRRI)	 in	 Los	 Baños.	 The	 IRRI	 was	 a	 long-term	
research	 program	 initially	 funded	 by	 the	 Ford	 Foundation	 and	 the	 Rockefeller	
Foundation	 dedicated	 to	 research	 on	 high-yield	 rice	 breeds.	 The	 Japanese	 connection	
was	 essential	 to	 the	 operations	 of	 the	 IRRI.	 For	 example,	 a	 bibliography	of	 translated	
rice-research	 articles	 in	 the	 possession	 of	 the	 IRRI	 in	 1975	 noted	 that,	 other	 than	
English,	 the	 language	 in	which	most	articles	were	published	was	 Japanese.	 In	order	 to	
make	 the	 information	 in	 these	 articles	 accessible,	 a	 branch	 of	 the	 IRRI	 Library	 and	
Documentation	 Center	 was	 established	 in	 Tokyo	 to	 produce	 translations	 (Malagayo-
Alluri	1976,	2).		
The	previous	section	recounted	the	Japanese	experience	of	bringing	rice	agriculture	
to	 Hainan	 with	 less-than-impressive	 results	 under	 the	 constraints	 of	 war.	 After	 the	
Second	World	War,	the	perception	that	Japan	was	the	torchbearer	of	rice	research	for	
the	 rest	 of	 Asia	 was	 reconfigured	 under	 a	 new	 political	 order,	 because	 Japan	was	 in	
alliance	 with	 the	 United	 States	 and	 had	 access	 to	 its	 capital.	 No	 longer	 aimed	 at	
exploiting	 land	 to	 support	 an	 exclusive	 clique	 of	 Japanese	 capitalists,	 the	 research	
entered	 an	 era	 of	 international	 cooperation	 with	 friendly	 nations	 aligned	 with	 the	
Western	bloc	during	the	Cold	War.		
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The	means	remained	the	same	as	before:	better-yielding	planting	materials	backed	
by	the	right	supplies	of	fertilizers	and	irrigation	water,	and	access	to	profitable	markets.	
And	with	figures	like	Eikichi	Iso	continuing	a	career	that	touched	upon	Taiwan	and	parts	
of	 Southeast	Asia,	 the	people	who	had	been	 responsible	 for	 the	 successes	of	 colonial	
Taiwanese	 rice	 research	 were	 actively	 involved	 in	 making	 a	 success	 of	 the	 postwar	
international	rice-research	order.5	
	
Conclusion	
	
Between	 September	 20	 and	 November	 11,	 1944,	 a	 Philippine	 Agricultural	 Survey	
Commission	visited	Taiwan.	Nemesio	B.	Mendiola	conducted	a	study	to	“determine	the	
methods	of	culture	used,	particularly	what	characteristics	or	features	of	the	Taiwan	rice	
culture	had	been	responsible	for	the	phenomenal	progress	it	had	made,”	and	thence	to	
adapt	 whatever	 was	 practical	 for	 conditions	 in	 the	 Philippines	 (Mendiola	 1949,	 41).	
Mendiola’s	 language	makes	 it	 apparent	 that	 Taiwan	 had	made	 a	 name	 for	 itself	 as	 a	
rice-producing	 territory,	 and	 that	 this	 “phenomenal	 progress”	 could	 be	 credited	 to	
Japanese	rule.	
The	tropicality	of	Taiwan,	coupled	with	its	precarious	finances,	presented	a	puzzle	
to	 its	 Japanese	 colonizers.	 How	were	 they	 to	 transform	 Taiwan	 into	 an	 economically	
viable	 possession	 of	 their	 fledgling	 empire?	 Agriculture	 became	 a	 key	 part	 of	 the	
solution.	But	before	agriculture	could	be	reformed,	the	politics	had	to	be	set	right.	Goto	
Shinpei’s	 commitment	 to	 transform	Taiwan	 through	 “principles	 of	 Biology”	 led	 to	 the	
accumulation	 of	 capital	 and	 its	 direction	 toward	 productive	 applications.	 Agricultural	
research	 would	 serve	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 how	 tropicality	 could	 benefit	 the	
colonizers	 and	 the	 capitalists	 in	 their	 ranks,	 and	Horai	 rice	would	 be	 one	 of	 its	 signal	
accomplishments.	This	progress	could	not	be	achieved	without	friction,	for	first	it	had	to	
get	 funded	 by	 a	 government	 faced	with	multiple	 demands	 and	 scarce	 treasure.	Once	
undertaken,	the	impact	of	Horai	cultivation	upon	the	colonial	economy	was	complicated	
and	not	beneficial	to	the	capitalist	class	in	a	simple	and	direct	manner.	
The	land	survey	and	tax	regime	imposed	by	the	Japanese	confirmed	tenant	farmers	
in	the	possession	of	their	land.	As	a	result,	sugar	farming	did	not	give	rise	to	the	large-
scale	 farming	 that	 characterized	 the	 crop	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 and	 other	 colonial	 sites.	
Instead,	the	Japanese	capitalists	took	control	of	the	sugar	factories	and	imposed	terms	
of	trade	that	exploited	the	farmers	supplying	them.	Into	this	mix	came	Horai,	a	fruit	of	
colonial	state	science.	Even	as	it	disrupted	the	state-imposed	sugar-buying	monopsony	
arrangements,	it	also	became	a	source	of	strength	for	both	the	Government-General	of	
Taiwan	and	the	Japanese	Empire	as	a	whole.	
                                                
5	Iso	did	not	agree	to	participate	directly	in	IRRI	research	efforts.	He	preferred	a	“grounded”	
approach	working	closely	with	farmers,	as	he	had	done	in	Taiwan	before	the	war,	as	opposed	to	
operating	from	a	center	of	calculation	spreading	super	seeds	to	parts	unseen	and	distant,	such	as	
India	(Fujihara	2018,	145–146).	
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Horai	rice	and	the	expertise	required	to	produce	it	gave	Taiwan	a	raison	d’être	as	a	
rice	 colony.	 Taiwan	 supplied	 the	 Japanese	 home	 islands	 with	 rice	 during	 the	months	
when	they	faced	shortages	due	to	the	absence	of	a	winter	crop.	The	success	of	Horai	led	
the	Japanese	rulers	of	Taiwan	to	envision	setting	up	a	“second	Taiwan”	on	Hainan	when	
that	 territory	 fell	 under	 Japanese	 occupation,	 though	 this	 scheme	 failed	 due	 to	 war	
conditions	 despite	 the	 limited	 successes	 achieved	 in	 areas	 tightly	 supervised	 by	
experienced	personnel	sent	from	Taiwan.	
The	expertise	of	mobile	agents	of	science	such	as	Eikichi	Iso	made	the	development	
of	 Horai	 rice	 possible.	 Embodying	 modern	 scientific	 knowledge	 obtained	 first	 from	
Hokkaido	and	then	from	Cornell,	 Iso	 imaginatively	mapped	Japanese	conditions	to	the	
latitudes	of	Taiwan	in	order	to	devise	ideal	plans	for	matching	Japonica	types	to	various	
others	 based	 on	 likely	 success.	 The	 emerging	 understanding	 of	 photoperiodism,	 first	
identified	by	Garner	and	Allard,	enabled	 Iso	to	 focus	on	the	response	of	 rice	plants	 to	
daylight	hours	in	his	efforts	at	selection.	
Keeping	 pace	 with	 the	 expanding	 Japanese	 Empire	 of	 the	 1930s	 and	 1940s,	 Iso	
observed	rice	conditions	far	beyond	Taiwan,	in	southern	China,	Indochina,	Malaya,	and	
Java.	After	the	Second	World	War,	deprived	of	its	empire,	Japan	continued	to	operate	as	
a	guiding	light	for	the	development	of	rice	science	in	Southeast	Asia,	but	as	a	part	of	Pax	
Americana	 and	 with	 new	 headquarters	 at	 the	 IRRI	 in	 the	 Philippines	 funded	 by	 the	
Rockefeller	Foundation	and	Ford	Foundation.	
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